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THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST 
AND IMPROVING ANTITRUST AGENCY 
CAPACITY 
D. Daniel Sokol* 
One of the key issues in international antitrust has been how to make 
antitrust effective around the world.  Most antitrust laws have been adopted 
or significantly modified since 1990.1  A number of key jurisdictions are ei-
ther fairly new to antitrust altogether or to an antitrust regime that effective-
ly employs the latest in economic thinking and the legal tools necessary to 
promote competition.2  Jurisdictions that have made antitrust a new and im-
portant cornerstone to economic policy include Brazil, Russia, India, and 
China.  Because of the stakes involved in the ability of antitrust to foster 
economic development and to prevent misguided antitrust policy from op-
erating as a regulatory tax, it is critical that the future of antitrust focus on 
improved capacity around the world.3  By capacity, I mean the ability of a 
given agency to undertake well reasoned and effective decisionmaking in 
the implementation of antitrust policy.  There are two concerns for countries 
in various stages of antitrust development: harmonization of domestic anti-
trust with international antitrust ―best practices,‖ and implementation of an 
effective antitrust regime.4  In an effort to solve these issues, policymakers 
in antitrust emphasize two dynamics to shape the development of increased 
capacity of younger antitrust regimes.  The first is international antitrust in-
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  See Global Competition Forum Homepage, http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org (link). 
2
  To provide some historic perspective on how significant a change this is, William Kovacic notes, 
―In 1979, nobody envisioned that competition policy would be a concern beyond a relatively small 
number of countries with well established market economies.‖  Interview by Stéphanie Yon with Wil-
liam Kovacic, Chairman, Fed. Trade. Comm’n: A new Chairman for the US FTC, CONCURRENCES N° 
3-2008 at 6, available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/kovacic/2008concurrencesinterview.pdf (link). 
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  Eleanor M. Fox, Economic Development, Poverty, and Antitrust: The Other Path, 13 SW. J. L. & 
TRADE AM. 211 (2007) (articulating a link between antitrust and economic development). 
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  There is variation in how one defines antitrust ―effectiveness.‖  See, e.g., International Competi-
tion Network, Agency Effectiveness Project, (2008), available at 
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trust norms.5  The other is technical assistance, either from these interna-
tional antitrust institutions or directly from more developed antitrust agen-
cies or other aid providers.  By technical assistance, I mean the process 
through which agencies improve their capacity to undertake competition 
policy. 
This Essay focuses on how both external (international institutions) 
and internal (agency capacity and technical assistance) dynamics shape the 
capacity of younger agencies to undertake antitrust in their jurisdictions.  
Both approaches play an important role in improving capacity.  In the case 
of technical assistance, this Essay analyzes survey data from recipient agen-
cies of antitrust technical assistance to determine the most effective means 
of improving antitrust agency capacity.  Part I explains the type of capacity 
building that antitrust agencies undertake themselves.  The rest of this Es-
say focuses upon international efforts that can assist agencies in capacity 
building, but it is important not to overlook capacity building efforts that 
can occur at the agency level.  Part II describes the work that international 
antitrust institutions undertake to improve agency capacity.  Part III pro-
vides an analysis of survey data that shows how technical assistance from 
outside providers can improve agency capacity.  Part IV concludes and of-
fers recommendations to improve developing world antitrust agency capaci-
ty building. 
I. AGENCY LEVEL CAPACITY BUILDING 
As young agencies face significant capacity constraints, they require 
assistance in how to use their scarce resources as effectively as possible to 
improve their ability to combat anticompetitive conduct.  Though interna-
tional antitrust institutions play a significant role in improving the capacity 
of newer antitrust agencies, capacity building ultimately is a local expe-
rience, and in-country dynamics play a critical role in shaping the contours 
of antitrust policy and enforcement.  A number of factors impact the ability 
of an agency to be effective.  These include the legal structure of antitrust 
law in their country, the human resources within the agency, and the agen-
cy’s capacities within a larger country-wide regulatory system, such as the 
judiciary, sector regulators, and the legislature.  Factors also include the 
level of independence of the agency from political interference, the level of 
investigatory authority provided under the law, and the funding to the agen-
cy. 
Antitrust agencies may not have the skill set and internal capacity to 
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agencies.  In some cases, new agencies only start their learning curve after 
they have been set up, as agency staff may not understand antitrust law and 
its application before then.7  There are two elements to the learning curve.  
The first is the environment of the institution (rules of the game).  The 
second is institutional governance (play of the game).8  For an antitrust 
agency, the ―rules‖ stage includes the conceptualization and creation of the 
antitrust agency and its institutional structure.  It also includes drafting the 
antitrust law and ensuring that its provisions import the latest economic 
thinking with application to the specific political and economic dynamics of 
a country and rules of the game that allow an agency to combat anticompe-
titive conduct. 
―Play‖ issues present themselves once an agency has become estab-
lished and resources shift to more active antitrust enforcement.  These play 
issues require the institutionalization of antitrust by embedding it into a 
country’s legal structure and the creation of antitrust norms for the agency.9  
Antitrust is evolutionary.10  This suggests that agencies will confront differ-
ent variations of problems over time.  The evolution happens at a number of 
levels—shifts in government policies, economic thinking, and judicial in-
terpretation.  These issues impact the ability of agencies to fight against an-
ticompetitive conduct given changing political-economy dynamics within a 
country. 
The cost of the allocation of scarce resources towards enforcement vis-
à-vis the payoff is likely to differ across countries and regions.  Detection 
and litigation costs are not the same in every jurisdiction.  Cases are, to a 
certain extent, situation specific, and the ability to take on work in merger 
control, cartel enforcement, competition advocacy, or unilateral conduct 
changes in response to technical advances, political shifts and economic 
growth.  Agencies may be limited in what they can do based on the limits of 
their antitrust law or larger legal system.11 Moreover, in countries with pri-
vate rights of action, an agency may not need to spend as many resources 
against certain types of anticompetitive conduct because private litigants 
may substitute for the antitrust agency. 
                                                                                                                           
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 1025, 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=917909 (link). 
7
  Michael Krakowski, Competition Policy Works: The Effect of Competition Policy on the Intensity 
of Competition—An International Cross-Country Comparison 4 (HWWA Discussion Paper, Paper No. 
332, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=854908. 
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  Oliver E. Williamson, Why Law, Economics, and Organization?, 1 ANNU. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 369, 
385 (2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=255624 (link). 
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Economies, 23 BROOK J. INT’L L. 403 (1997). 
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II. INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST INSTITUTIONS CAPACITY BUILDING 
One international governance mechanism to improve the capacity of 
antitrust agencies comes in the form of ―soft law‖ institutions, which is 
based on nonbinding norms.12  International antitrust soft law institutions 
focus on cooperation to ensure international harmonization and the creation 
of antitrust norms.13  These soft law institutions identify best practices from 
around the world, create norms, and push the diffusion of such norms, such 
as the norm to push for greater transparency and predictability in mergers.  
Over time, through increased iterations of meetings and interactions, agen-
cies develop a level of trust and relationship capital with one another.14  The 
network of agency level cooperation becomes strengthened through this 
trust.15  Trust in turn creates opportunities for increased cooperation among 
agencies.16  This process creates opportunities for younger antitrust agencies 
to adopt best practices in a setting that allows for integration of the norms 
into the local political and economic realities of a given country. 
Three soft law international antitrust institutions provide support to en-
courage harmonization based on the creation and diffusion of antitrust best 
practices.  The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD)17 addresses antitrust issues primarily through its Competition Law 
and Policy Committee.  A second international antitrust institution is the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).18  
UNCTAD serves as the UN sponsored voice for the developing world.  
Like the OECD, it organizes conferences, peer reviews, technical assistance 
missions, and reports.  However, UNCTAD is more limited in its impact as 
some of its viewpoints differ from those of the international antitrust institu-
tions in which more developed countries shape the antitrust agenda.  The 





  Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L 
ORG. 421, 434 (2000) (describing a far more nuanced set of factors that go into what constitutes soft law 
than word limits permit for this Essay); D. Daniel Sokol, Order Without (Enforceable) Law: Why Coun-
tries Enter Into Non-Enforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements, 83 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 231, 242 (2008) (arguing hard law antitrust implicates the WTO and other trade agree-
ments).   
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  D. Daniel Sokol, Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional Challenge of International Anti-
trust in a Global Gilded Age, 4 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 37 (2007). 
14
  Werner Guth, Peter Ockenfels & Markus Wendel, Cooperation Based on Trust: An Experimental 
Investigation, 18 J. ECON. PSYCH. 15 (1997); Larry E. Ribstein, Law vs. Trust, 81 B.U.L. REV. 553, 
569–70 (2001); Partha Dasgupta, Trust as a Commodity, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING 
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 49 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988). 
15
  Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Towards a Legal Theory of Supranationality—The Viability of the Network 
Concept, 3 EURO L.J. 33 (1997). 
16
  Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, 14 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 159 (2000). 
17
  Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, http://www.oecd.org/competition 
(home page for competition committee) (link). 
18
  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Competition Law and Policy, 
http://www.unctad.org/competition (link). 
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work (ICN).19  The ICN’s purpose is to identify, create, and spread antitrust 
norms and results driven outputs to reduce the costs that make enforcement 
against anticompetitive conduct more difficult.  One effect of ICN promul-
gated nonbinding recommended practices has been adoption by many anti-
trust agencies.20 
One mechanism to diffuse norms through international antitrust institu-
tions is the process of peer review.  A peer review is a diagnostic (that the 
OECD pioneered) that measures the strengths and weaknesses of a coun-
try’s antitrust system.21  Peer reviews cover a number of issues.  After de-
scribing the background of a country’s antitrust system, the peer review 
engages in a critical analysis of substantive issues such as merger control, 
cartels, and monopolization.  A second element of the review is to analyze 
the institutional setting of antitrust of a given country.  This includes the en-
forcement structure, resources, and practices of the agency, the role of the 
judiciary, and the impact of international issues.  After an analysis of subs-
tantive and institutional issues, the peer review provides conclusions and 
policy options.  In a formal meeting along with other countries’ antitrust 
agency representatives present, the reviewed agency responds to the peer 
review.  Then other agencies comment upon the peer review.22  This process 
allows agencies to offer constructive criticism of policies to one another.  
Bad policies may be subject to shaming of an agency by its peers.  Through 
this mechanism, peer reviews can help to create compliance with best prac-
tices.23 
Another mechanism that increases antitrust agency capacity is the use 
of reports that survey members about their practices.  Reports allow agen-
cies to take stock of their practices relative to other agencies.  Agencies 
learn from the experiences and approaches of other agencies in the sum-





  International Competition Network Home Page, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org 
(link). 
20
  J. William Rowley & A. Neil Campbell, Implementation of the ICN’s Recommended Merger 
Practices: A Work-in-(Early)-Progress, ANTITRUST SOURCE, July 2005, at 1–2. The size of the ICN, 
with roughly 100 member antitrust agencies and additional participation from nongovernmental partici-
pants seems small enough that reputation based enforcement mechanisms work. 
21
  Fabrizio Pagani, Peer Review as a Tool for Co-operation and Change: An Analysis of an OECD 
Working Method, OECD SG/LEG (2002), at 1, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/16/1955285.pdf (peer review is the assessment of a state by other 
states designed to improve policy making) (link). 
22
  Id. (peer reviewed is characterized by dialogue and interactivity and contains a consultation 
phase). 
23
  The OECD recommended a change to Brazilian merger control in 2005 based on international 
practices, where a current bill before Brazil’s Congress seeks to implement such changes. 
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amples of such reports are how agencies address issues of predatory 
ing24 or how agencies confront dominant firms.25 
Aiding in the creation of improved capacity, the ICN tailors a number 
of its work products to younger antitrust agencies.  These include the crea-
tion of enforcement manuals, reports on how jurisdictions address various 
types of conduct, workshops to improve investigation techniques and ana-
lytical approaches, and meetings of enforcers and nongovernmental advi-
sors to discuss report findings and agency priorities.26  These outputs 
provide an opportunity to share ideas and enforcement experiences.  For 
young agencies, the ICN also organizes regular meetings in which agency 
members from around the world meet via conference call on a regular basis 
to discuss how to best utilize analytical tools for cases and policy work.  
The ICN also spends considerable time and resources on conceptualizing 
agency priorities, which the OECD and UNCTAD do as well. 
How effective are these international institutions?  It is difficult to de-
termine measures of success generally based on whether this was the best 
way to spend time and resources.  Anecdotally, such international efforts 
seem to be improving the capacity of younger agencies.27  Soft law is most 
effective at reducing costs when the costs stem from information and coor-
dination costs.28  For example, antitrust soft law institutions have become 
increasingly effective in reducing the costs associated with merger review 
and cartel enforcement.29  The reason for this is simple: international merger 
control and international cartel enforcement require coordination, such as 
how much time to approve a merger or to ensure that the law provides ade-
quate investigative powers against cartels.  There is no serious disagreement 
as to the pernicious effects of cartels or the fact that multiple and overlap-
ping merger control systems create increased compliance costs around the 
world.  Nor is there disagreement that the merger regimes of younger agen-
cies should not create unduly burdensome restrictions when there are not 










  OECD, COMPETITION ON THE MERITS (2005), available at 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/13/35911017.pdf (describing the different theories to prevent abuse of do-
minance) (link). 
26
  Sokol, supra note 13, at 109–15 (describing the ICNs attempts to promote cooperation and har-
monization among antitrust jurisdiction via benchmarking and working group issue study). 
27
  Cf. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, COMPETITION POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
WORKING GROUP: SUB GROUP 1, AGENCY EFFECTIVENESS PROJECT (2008), available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/CPI/CPI_WG_1.pdf (evaluating the effi-
cacy of twenty national and international regulatory and advisory bodies) (link). 
28
  Causation may go the other way.  Where agencies cannot reach agreement on binding rules, we 
are more likely to see soft law as a result. 
29
  Sokol, supra note 13, at 112–15. 
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In substantive areas of law, antitrust soft law institutions may have dif-
ficulty implementing best practices where there is disagreement over ana-
lytical approaches, particularly between the United States and the EU.  For 
example, compare the U.S. and EU responses to Microsoft litigations on 
single firm conduct.30  These tensions over differing analytical frameworks 
have significant potential repercussions.  Without the active support of the 
major powers in antitrust, the EU and U.S., the efforts of the international 
antitrust institutions will be severely limited in their ability to create and 
promote increased capacity building around the world.  Should the EU and 
U.S. not put their resources and efforts into soft law institutions, the lack of 
their participation would compromise the effectiveness of any antitrust soft 
law institution. 
III. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CAPACITY BUILDING 
Apart from agency level building and international institutions, another 
form of capacity building is more formalized and occurs through technical 
assistance to newer antitrust agencies.  Unlike general norm diffusion, tech-
nical assistance directly targets specific antitrust agencies and the overall 
competition system of a given jurisdiction.  Technical assistance is the 
process through which donors provide assistance to recipients for direct dif-
fusion of knowledge and skills.  In the antitrust context, technical assistance 
allows for agencies to build their skills identifying potential anticompetitive 
conduct, combating it through cases, filings, legislative means, and reaching 
out to government and non-government stakeholders in the larger antitrust 
system.  Technical assistance also entails providing advice on how to pri-
oritize agency goals, how to manage an effective antitrust agency, and how 
to make competition policy relevant outside of the agency. 
For the most part, the antitrust policy and academic communities re-
main in the dark about what makes for effective antitrust technical assis-
tance.  The Antitrust Modernization Commission’s 2007 Report 
recommended that Congress directly fund antitrust technical assistance 
through the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC), rather than indirectly through USAID.31  This recommendation 
was made without any guidance from empirical work on the effectiveness 
of DOJ/FTC technical assistance or the effectiveness more generally of an-





  See, e.g., Daniel Spulber, Competition Policy and the Incentive to Innovate: The Dynamic Effects 
of Microsoft v. Commission, 25 YALE J. REG. 247 (2008) (describing the European approach in Micro-
soft v. Commission); WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE MICROSOFT CASE ANTITRUST, HIGH 
TECHNOLOGY, AND CONSUMER WELFARE 2 (2007) (providing a detailed analysis of the U.S. response). 
31
  ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS (Apr. 2007) 219, 
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf (―The 
commission believes that providing funding . . . directly to the antitrust agencies will help to ensure that 
the objectives and priorities of antitrust technical assistance are properly weighed.‖) (link). 
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on antitrust technical assistance focused as much on identifying what strat-
egies are ineffective as identifying what are effective.32  Similarly, capacity 
building has been the topic of meetings at international antitrust institu-
tions.33   
Previous empirical work on antitrust technical assistance has identified 
that short term interventions (STIs) and long term advisors (LTAs) play a 
role in more effective technical assistance.34  LTAs are long term in the 
sense that they spend an extended amount of time (such as a year) working 
in the recipient county’s antitrust agency—for example, an FTC economist 
who spends a year residing in Mexico’s antitrust agency.  In contrast, an 
STI is an intervention that addresses a discrete issue or task, such as how to 
bring a successful merger challenge in the banking sector or how to gather 
evidence against cartels, which a DOJ antitrust attorney might do in a one 
week session for Indonesia’s antitrust agency. 
In a survey undertaken in 2004 for technical assistance from 1996–
2003, the ICN gave member agencies who had received technical assistance 
a 1,000-plus-question questionnaire about their experiences.35  Below I pro-
vide a descriptive analysis of the survey data, which is distinct from the 
formal modeling that Professor Stiegert and I undertook in another paper.36  
There are a number of theoretical observations and new evidence from the 
ICN data that provide further guidance on the most effective way to utilize 
LTAs and STIs. 
Any critique of antitrust technical assistance must address the funda-
mental issue that scholars and policy makers often ignore: do technical as-
sistance interventions choose the appropriate expert for the technical 
assistance?37  It may be that experts lack sufficient competence to provide 
technical assistance.  The wrong people may be chosen for the STI and 





  2008 International Technical Assistance Workshop, ―Charting the Future Course of International 
Technical Assistance at the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission,‖ Feb. 6, 
2008, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workshops/techassist2008/236894.pdf (link). 
33
  See, e.g., ICN, ASSESSING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE: PRELIMINARY RESULTS 1 (2005), available 
at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/conference_4th_bonn_2005/ 
assessing_technical_assistance.pdf (―Capacity building is the major challenge facing developing compe-
tition authorities today.‖) (link); OECD, COMPETITION ASSESSMENT TOOLKIT (2007), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/59/39679833.pdf (describing ways to increase competition) (link).   
34
  Nicholson, Sokol & Stiegert, supra note 6. 
35
  The survey instruments can be reviewed at International Competition Network Document Li-
brary, Working Group: Competition Policy Implementation, 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/index.php/en/library/working-group/16 (link).  Among 
forty nine agencies surveyed, seventeen agencies had an LTA while twenty nine agencies had an STI. 
36
  See D. Daniel Sokol & Kyle W. Stiegert, An Empirical Evaluation of Long Term Advisors and 
Short Term Interventions in Technical Assistance and Capacity Building (Univ. of Missouri Legal Stu-
dies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2008-03, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1095884# (link). 
37
  Nicholson, Sokol & Stiegert, supra note 6 (finding that technical assistance is more effective 
when both donor and recipient are actively involved in its planning). 
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knowledge (or relatively weak knowledge of antitrust based on only a few 
years of practice in this area) is that such advisors may not themselves have 
the appropriate level of knowledge to provide assistance to young antitrust 
agencies. 
The quality mismatch may be a function of supply side issues.  Some 
technical assistance may be in countries or regions that high quality advi-
sors are not willing to travel to or reside in for any number of reasons.  If 
the donor chooses an advisor who is not a member of a current antitrust 
agency, this may open up technical assistance to full time consultants.  
Some may have limited experience specific to antitrust, even though they 
may be experienced in regulated industries more generally or in public ad-
ministration.  These consultants may tend to be relatively weak in their un-
derstanding of antitrust and may yield poor results in the quality of their 
technical assistance intervention. 
A. Who Provides Technical Assistance? 
I examined the make-up of technical assistance advisors to get a sense 
of whether or not they are the most effective for the type of work at hand.  
Figures 1 and 2 identify the educational backgrounds of LTAs and STIs re-
spectively.  LTAs and STIs have similar educational backgrounds.  The 
highest percentage of LTAs and STIs have law backgrounds (53.85 percent 
and 44.44 percent for LTAs and STIs respectively) followed by economics 
(23.08 percent and 33.33 percent for LTAs and STIs respectively).  Next 
are advisors with joint law and economics degrees (15.38 percent and 9.26 
percent for LTAs and STIs respectively).  The educational backgrounds of 








































Figure 2: Educational Background of STI 
 
From these findings, what remains unclear is what percentage of law-
yers and economists had a background in competition law or competition 
economics.  I get the answer to this indirectly by examining the origin of 
the LTAs and STIs.  Of LTAs, 71 percent came to the recipient agency 
from competition agencies.  Of the remainder, 14 percent came from law 
school faculties, 7 percent from economics departments or business school 
faculties, and 7 percent from private firms.  The breakdown looked a bit dif-
ferent in terms of STIs, which may account for why STIs seem to be less ef-
fective.  A smaller percentage of STIs came from competition agencies (62 
percent).  The next highest number of STIs originated in law school facul-
ties (14 percent), followed by economics departments or business school fa-
culties (9 percent), multination lender or multinational organizations (6 
percent), private firms (6 percent), and not available (3 percent).38 
B. Evaluation of Technical Assistance 
In general, agencies were more satisfied with LTAs than STIs.  How-
ever, when the advisor had a law background, agencies were more satisfied 
with STIs than LTAs.  Conversely, when the advisor had an economic 
background, agencies were more satisfied with LTAs than STIs.  Recipient 
agencies were more satisfied with LTA than STI providers who have a 
background in economics.  Why might this be the case?  Many discrete le-
gal issues where attorneys are selected for which advice can be given are 
hands on and lend themselves to short interventions, such as how to bring a 
case, how to gather evidence, or how to depose a witness.  Economics 
might be more difficult to absorb in a short period of time.  A one week 
course on the use of econometric techniques may not be easy to absorb for 
an agency in which perhaps only one economist has an advanced degree in 






  The smaller numbers for this and other charts are not statistically significant. 
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I evaluated the accomplishments of technical assistance via responses 
to questions concerning how satisfied agencies were with their technical as-
sistance experience.  To simplify, I concentrated my analysis on three over-
all evaluations on both the LTA and STI survey: (a) the overall quality of 
the LTA/STI component; (b) the overall quality of the advisors themselves; 
and (c) the overall impact of the LTA/STI component on the effectiveness 
of the agency at fulfilling its mission or objectives.  Agencies answered the 
questions by using a scale of 1 (very dissatisfied) to 7 (very satisfied).  I 
calculated the averages of each response and classified all evaluations by 













Figure 3: The Average of the Overall Evaluations of Technical Assistance 
Providers (Law) 
 
Figure 3 shows that for LTA and STI providers whose educational 
background is law, agencies are more satisfied with STI than LTA interven-
tions in the overall quality of the component and advisors.  In contrast, the 
overall impact concerning the effectiveness of the agency at fulfilling its 
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Figure 4: The Average of the Overall Evaluations of Technical Assistance 
Providers (Economics) 
 
Figure 4 illustrates that recipient agencies are more satisfied with LTA 
than STI providers who have a background in economics.  Scores overall 
were higher for economists than for lawyers, but much of this difference 
was based upon stronger scores among economist LTAs relative to lawyer 
LTAs.39 
C. What Kind of Technical Assistance? 
Figure 5 shows the types of anticompetitive practices that technical as-
sistance sought to overcome: cartel agreements, non-cartel horizontal 
agreements, vertical agreements, and abuse of dominance/monopolization. 
Excluding unavailable responses, abuse of dominance has the highest per-
centage of technical assistance intervention at 31 percent.  The next highest 
was vertical agreements at 25 percent, with cartel agreements and non-
















  Some of these scores might be influenced by factors outside the actual quality of the technical as-
sistance.  Unfortunately, there was no way for us to measure this because there is no central database of 
technical assistance missions but this outside bias could affect all of the results. 
Figure 4: The Average of the Overall Evaluations of Technical 
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Figure 5: Types of Cases 
 
Though not shown graphically, types of cases can be broken down into 
both LTA and STI components.  In the case of LTA interventions, the 
breakdown for types of cases was abuse of dominance at 40 percent fol-
lowed by the remaining three types of cases evenly split at 20 percent each.  
In the case of STI interventions, abuse of dominance made up 44 percent of 
the cases, vertical and non-cartel vertical agreements each made up 22 per-
cent of the cases, and cartel agreements made up the remaining 11 percent 
of cases undertaken.  These breakdowns suggest that technical assistance 
reaches broadly in many different substantive areas of antitrust and that re-
gardless of what agency enforcement priorities should be, young agencies 
confront many types of conduct challenges immediately. 
D. Is Some Technical Assistance Better Than Others? 
My hypothesis is that LTA would be viewed as more effective than 
STI.  As a theoretical matter, where there is a staff that does not have high 
levels of knowledge and experience in certain tasks, an LTA can overcome 
the knowledge gap and jump start the types of work that an agency might 
otherwise not be able to undertake.40  Because an LTA is embedded within 
an agency, an LTA may respond rapidly to local changes because it has 
more flexibility.41  An STI, in contrast, may require months of planning so 
that by the time it arrives, there is another issue that has developed that is of 






  William E. Kovacic, Antitrust and Competition Policy in Transition Economies: A Preliminary 
Assessment, in 1999 ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE 513, 537 
(Barry Hawk ed., 2000) (―The best assistance programs are anchored by the presence of long-term advi-
sors who reside in-country and work directly with the host country’s policy officials.‖). 
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  Of course, the degree to which an LTA is embedded varies greatly based on the receptiveness of 
the recipient agency. 
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Because an LTA has the ability to contextualize an agency’s needs and 
priorities rather than being confined to a discrete task, the LTA may call in 
the right STIs for specific needs of an agency.  For example, a recent FTC 
LTA called in a short term advisor to provide training on the economics of 
price squeezes in regulated industries.  A second advantage of LTAs is that 
they have the flexibility to wrap themselves around problems as they arise.  
In contrast, short term missions may not provide an adequate amount of 
time to make significant progress on an issue.  Moreover, should an issue 
take an unexpected twist, an LTA need not constantly seek approval to fo-
cus on different tasks and when to request additional assistance in the form 
of STIs.  Finally, because of longer tenure at an antitrust agency, an LTA 
will gain a greater opportunity to develop trust and credibility with the 
agency than an STI advisor would.42 
On the other hand, STIs might be more successful for several reasons.  
Some interventions need not be long term.  There may be discrete tasks that 
can be undertaken in just a few days for which a short term intervention is 
more appropriate.  STIs may be effective in situations in which the donor 
and recipient are in agreement as to the appropriate assessment of the agen-
cy, its strengths and weaknesses.  An STI can serve a diagnostic purpose to 
gauge the skills and temperament of the agency staff and leadership.  Alter-
natively, an STI may highlight the need for and create legitimacy for a bet-
ter push for an LTA.  STIs tend to be effective when there is a well defined 
problem that requires specialized skills.  For example, a competition agency 
analyzing its first merger in the banking industry might benefit from an STI 
that includes a merger specialist in the banking sector.  The most effective 
STIs will be those that build technical skills and capacity in an agency on 
discrete issues, and thus have less need to understand the general political 
and economic context surrounding the agency.  STIs that might be particu-
larly effective might be those that address issues of investigative techniques 
rather than ones of strategic issues, such as which priorities to pursue. 
The relative weakness may be that STIs may provide general policy 
prescriptions that are not localized to deal with the specifics of the agency 
and its political economy.43  This includes assumptions about the scope of 
antitrust legislation, the role of the judiciary, and the context for obtaining 
nonagency approval to undertake enforcement.  In countries where there is 





  There are some caveats.  LTAs may focus on donor goals rather than recipient agency goals, if 
the two are not the same.  This could create a disconnect between the LTA and the recipient agency.  For 
example, goals may diverge when the recipient of antitrust technical assistance begins to investigate a 
firm from the donor’s country.  Does the technical assistance relationship lead to effective monitoring by 
the donor of the LTA or STI?  What incentives does accountability (or lack thereof) create?  In an effort 
to reduce the agency problem, donors may focus on efforts with more project-related tangible gains (for 
example, more cases rather than fewer but better cases).  I did not have an effective way of measuring 
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other parts of government to undertake enforcement serves as a way of rent-
seeking for corrupt officials, so classroom truths would be of limited use. 
An additional problem for STIs that may lead to lower scores is the po-
tential lack of an opportunity to provide follow up assistance.  This may 
have led to general confusion on the part of the recipient agency as to 
whether and how to implement the advice of the STI.  Similarly, slow reac-
tion time may be an issue.  By the time donors launch an STI intervention—
weeks or months later—the issue may no longer be relevant. 
Based on these assumptions, one hypothesis is that LTAs could allow 
the recipient agencies to take on more kinds of work than STIs due to great-
er integration with the recipient and a better understanding of its needs.  On 
the general effectiveness of LTAs and STIs, I examined the answers to fol-
lowing question: Has the agency undertaken enforcement cases after the 
beginning of this project that it could not have undertaken without the tech-
nical assistance received during the project? 
In the case of LTA, Figure 6 illustrates that 47 percent of respondents 
answered yes, that the presence of the LTA had assisted recipient agencies 
to undertake work that they could not have undertaken previously.  An ad-














Figure 6: New Types of Enforcement Due to LTAs 
 
In the case of STI, Figure 7 illustrates that only 14 percent of technical 
assistance recipients found that the STI allowed them to take on new cases 
that they could not have undertaken previously.  In contrast, 83 percent 
answered that STI intervention was ineffective in that it did not allow agen-
cies to take on new kinds of cases.  These findings support the hypothesis 
that LTAs may be more effective in creating increased new capacity for 
young antitrust agencies. 
 
 




















Figure 7: New Types of Enforcement Due to STIs 
 
STIs may not be as effective because an agency may not express its 
needs for STIs very well.  Consequently, the wrong experts may be sent 
over, or an intervention may spend too much or too little time on certain is-
sues.  For example, an agency may identify what it believes to be an exclu-
sive dealing issue, whereas after the first day of a three day mission, an 
advisor may discover that the underlying problem for the agency is actually 
a predatory pricing issue.  This leads to an ineffective use of presentation 
time, whereas LTAs have more time to perform a diagnostic to determine 
the actual needs of an agency. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE 
With respect to international institutions and soft law norms spreading, 
this Essay demonstrates that international antitrust institutions play an im-
portant role in improving agency capacity.  With respect to technical assis-
tance, descriptive analysis of the survey was in line with my hypothesis that 
LTAs would be more effective than STIs in undertaking new work.  The 
reasons for this are that LTAs had longer to understand the true economic 
situation in the country, the larger political context, and a sense of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the agency and supporting institutions of the 
country’s antitrust system.  Another finding is that economists and lawyers 
seemed to be more effective in some settings than others.  Not only does 
this analysis have relevance for future international antitrust efforts, my 
analysis may prove relevant to policies of how to make assistance more ef-
fective across other regulatory fields.  It shows the need for understanding 
the political and economic contexts of agencies and their countries, as well 
as creating efforts that have the flexibility to respond to problems as they 
arise and the need to choose experts appropriate for the problem, in creating 
effective aid.  Because these results are based on a small number of res-
ponses, we should be cautious in drawing conclusions from them.  Never-
theless, this initial analysis leads to a number of recommendations: 
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 More LTA.  More resources should be put into LTA provided by 
developed world antitrust agency staff. 
 Increased coordination between donors and recipients of technical 
assistance.  Technical assistance will be more effective when the 
requirements for such assistance are better understood by both do-
nor and recipient. 
 Increased norm creation on coordination issues.  Improved coordi-
nation across agencies has proven to be incredibly effective as a 
way to transmit antitrust norms and improve capacity.  Working on 
the nuts and bolts of everyday coordination and cooperation across 
different antitrust issues can improve the effectiveness of younger 
agencies. 
